At interdisciplinary conferences and forums about consciousness, I’ve noticed that more than a few scientists seem to seriously misunderstand the Hard Problem of Consciousness (HPC). In fact, I’ve begun to wonder whether misunderstanding the HPC is closer to the norm among scientists interested in consciousness. Continue reading “Misunderstanding the Hard Problem of Consciousness”
I vaguely recall that somewhere Karl Popper expresses his suspicion that some philosophers are unwilling to accept a solution to a challenging problem because they have become so fond of the problem. I wonder if this applies to the Liar Paradox and a “simple solution” that Eugene Mills supports. As Mills sees it (and I’m effectively convinced) the Liar is not paradoxical, but plain false, and though it appears to truthfully say it is false, it does not truthfully say so. So it’s just false. Continue reading “Was the Liar solved?”
High certainty does not entail inflexibility, narrow-mindedness, nor dogmatism.
For instance, I have high certainty that the Earth is not flat. This certainty is evidenced by the fact that if I were given the opportunity to bet accordingly under sufficiently reliable conditions, I would do so. I might even give the Flat-Earther better odds. Continue reading “Dogma vs Certainty”